Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement: The Shocking True Story of the Military Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor and the Fourteen Men Responsible for the Disaster
Bruce Lee, Henry C. Clausen
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“We might have possessed the genius to break the Purple code, but in 1941 we didn’t have the brains to know what to do with it.” —Henry C. Clausen, special investigator for secretary of war Henry L. Stimson
On December 6, 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, assured his staff that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor. The next morning, Japanese carriers steamed toward Hawaii to launch one of the most devastating surprise attacks in the history of war, proving the admiral disastrously wrong. Immediately, an investigation began into how the American military could have been caught so unaware.
The results of the initial investigation failed to implicate who was responsible for this intelligence debacle. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, realizing that high-ranking members of the military had provided false testimony, decided to reopen the investigation by bringing in an unknown major by the name of Henry C. Clausen. Over the course of ten months, from November 1944 to September 1945, Clausen led an exhaustive investigation. He logged more than fifty-five thousand miles and interviewed over one hundred military and civilian personnel, ultimately producing an eight-hundred-page report that brought new evidence to light. Clausen left no stone unturned in his dogged effort to determine who was truly responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor.
Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement reveals all of the eye-opening details of Clausen’s investigation and is a damning account of massive intelligence failure. To this day, the story surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor stokes controversy and conspiracy theories. This book provides conclusive evidence that shows how the US military missed so many signals and how it could have avoided the events of that fateful day.
a process of elimination. A. The following testimony, in relation to a winds execute, of Captain Safford before Admiral Hewitt reflects rather clearly his indefinite recollection of the winds matter and his efforts to reconstruct a “vague memory”:92 Captain SAFFORD. In the fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony ready for it. I realized I would
Commandant at Pearl Harbor and showed my letter of authorization from Secretary Stimson. I also suggested that he might want to call Commander Sonnett at the Pentagon for further clarification. Sonnett always cleared the way for me in this regard, and within short order, I was given access to the Navy’s code crackers at Pearl Harbor. The first man I saw was Capt. Thomas A. Huckins, who on December 7 and for some time before that had been in charge of the radio traffic analysis. He was also
day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine (anti-torpedo) nets. NOTE: This message was received here (Washington) on December 23. ARMY 8007 27605 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5) This was a vitally important intercept. Yet it had not been translated until three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Years
information to Bicknell without revealing its sources. (Perhaps Fielder was mixed up, because Layton testified that he met Bicknell only once.) “The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend Pearl Harbor Naval base,” Fielder said. He pointed out that the Army’s Seventh Air Force was the only Army unit capable of long-range defensive action, and that Colonel Raley was in liaison with Captain Layton about the matter, and that he had sworn Raley to secrecy
Secretary of War stated in his public statement of 1 December 1944 would be necessary. Of those interviewed, the following persons testified before me. I recorded their testimony in the form of affidavits, copies of which are attached as Exhibit “B”: General George C. Marshall General Douglas MacArthur Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow Lt. General Walter B. Smith Colonel Otis K. Sadtler Major General John R. Deane Major General Charles D. Herron Major